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“The topic is the potentially imminent breakdown of the twentieth century 
international drug control regime. A breakdown is not guaranteed but it is 
possible, and so it behooves interested parties to consider how events 
might play out” (Caulkins, 2015: 2).
“The question now is what comes after the drug wars” (Collins, 2016a: 6).
Introduction
It is now apparent that the political consensus that has sustained the universal, 
US-led, UNGASS codified, supply-side focused, ‘war on drugs’ model of 
international drug policy since the early 1970s is ‘cracking’ (Bewley-Taylor 2012; 
Collins 2014a: 6; 2017: 279; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 131). This is evident both 
through the statements of some prominent politicians, drawn largely from those 
producer and transit nations that are most directly affected by drug related 
violence (Caulkins 2015: 4; Collins 2014b: 9; 2016b: 13 Felbab-Brown 2014: 41; 
Inkster and Comolli 2012: 36; Mejia and Restrepo 2014: 26; Santos 2012: 2; 
Wainwright 2016: 139-140) and in the growing incidents of nations and states 
decriminalizing or legalizing the non-medical possession and use of certain drugs 
(Bewley-Taylor 2012: 332; Chatwin 2017: 80-81; Jelsma 2017; Wainwright 2016: 
241-253). This has been mirrored by a growing critical literature from drug policy 
scholars advocating international drug policy reform, broadly characterized by 
four principles: the advocacy of policy pluralism; experimentation; evidence 
gathering / evaluation; and the avoidance of drug festishization through their 
insertion within wider discourses of economic, social, political and environmental 
development (Collins 2014a: 6; 2014b: 13-14; 2017: 6-7; Gomis 2012: 14; Hall 
2017;  Inkster and Comolli 2012: 117-134; Levi 2014; Midgley et al. 2014; 
Taylor et al. 2013: 422-424). This is set broadly within a drug management, rather 
than eradication, framework and guided by concerns for trans-border justice and 
harm-reduction (Collins 2014b: 14; Gomis 2012: 3).
This paper builds upon this literature and explores some of the 
complexities of drug policy pluralization that have arguably been somewhat 
subsumed to date within critiques of the existing policy regime and discussions of 
its reform and of specific policy alternatives. This is not to argue that the current 
regime does not require reform, but rather that the complexities and problematics 
of its reform be more squarely acknowledged and their negotiation explored more 
directly. This paper does not set out, then, to evaluate individual drug policy 
options. There is a raft of literature that does this, much of which this paper cites. 
Rather, it explores potential issues surrounding the deployment of policies under a 
more plural drug policy regime, something that has gained relatively little 
attention in the literature to date. 
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The paper is circumscribed by a series of questions:
 What do we mean by drug policy pluralization?
 What are the prospects for drug policy pluralization?
 What will drug policy pluralization look like?
 What will be its effects?
 How might plural drug policies be distributed across international space?
Each one of these questions might be considered a complexity or 
problematic of drug policy pluralization. The engagement of the literature with 
these five questions is somewhat uneven. Whilst its engagement with the first two 
is extensive, and the third partial, it is much less extensive for the final two. It is 
the final two of these problematics that this paper addresses most directly. This is 
timely, it is argued here, as the outcomes of the final two questions are likely to 
have implications for the address of the first three. 
The paper offers a geographically sensitive reading of illegal drug markets.  
It is structured in three principal parts. The first part (which includes the sections 
'drug markets as regional phenomena' and 'drug markets as relational phenomena') 
rethinks drug markets here through the literatures of economic geography. This 
suggests a set of priorities that stem from a paucity of explicit reflection upon the 
connections between different drug markets, the connections between different 
sites within drug markets and the multi-scale production of drug markets. The 
second part ('drug policy asymmetries', 'drug policy repatriation and the extra-
national' and 'drug policies in combination') rethinks the challenges and 
opportunities of drug policy reform through the lens of economic geography. The 
final part outlines some research and policy implications that emerge from this 
project. In sum the paper argues for the greater inclusion of geographical 
perspectives within the growing advocacy of international drug policy reform. 
The paper proceeds now though to a short section outlining the geographical 
principles that are applied here. 
Economic Geographies of Illicit and Illegal Markets
The provision of illicit and illegal goods and services by criminal entrepreneurs 
form significant proportions of the contemporary global economy. The global 
trade in illegal drugs, for example, has been estimated as equivalent to 1.5 per 
cent of all money moving through the world's financial system and 7-8 per cent of 
world trade (UNODC, 2015: 1).  If accurate, this suggests a market roughly 
equivalent to that of the textile industry (Moynagh and Worsley, 2008: 176). 
Whilst criminal entrepreneurs, the markets they operate within and their effects 
have received a great deal of academic scrutiny, this has been somewhat 
circumscribed in disciplinary terms. Within the social sciences this has emanated 
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largely from anthropology, criminology, sociology and, to an extent, economics 
and political science. However, cognate disciplines, such as economic geography, 
which has otherwise been recognized as offering sophisticated readings of the 
spatialities of contemporary economic globalization, have produced only limited 
or nascent literatures exploring markets in illicit and illegal goods and services 
(Hall, 2013; 2017; Hudson, 2014; 2019; though see earlier examples, Allen, 2005; 
Rengert, 1996). This is a significant lacuna for economic geography in that it is 
able to say little about that 15-20 per cent of the global economy (Glenny, 2008) 
that has been attributed to these markets.
Contemporary economic geography, reflecting a complex and often 
contested evolution, offers a diverse theoretical and methodological body of 
enquiry (Aoyama et al., 2011). A broadly political-economy perspective is 
employed here, one that “recognises the complexity of the economy as constituted 
by labour processes, processes of material transformation, and processes of value 
creation and flow in specific time/space contexts” (Hudson, 2005: 13). This 
approach recognizes the roles of multiple agents within market processes which 
include, in this case, criminal entrepreneurs, states and international institutions, 
policing, military and security personnel, public health and medical agencies, drug 
consumers and civil society. 
This paper employs an explicitly geographical rendering of this political-
economy perspective, little applied to date to illicit and illegal markets, that is 
attentive to the agency of a variety of geographical phenomena within economic 
processes. These include spatial asymmetries both within illicit and illegal 
markets and in the conditions and contexts within which they are situated, 
including policy and regulatory regimes. These are both empirical outcomes and 
active constituents of uneven development. The paper is also attentive to the 
interplay of processes operating at, and across, different scales (Hudson, 2014: 
780) within the constitution and operation of illicit and illegal markets. It deploys 
this to scrutinize the potential scalar fixity and reach of their regulation through 
policy. Further, it considers illicit and illegal markets as relational phenomena, 
composed of multiple sites and complex connections between them. It explores 
here how interventions, such as changes in the policy or regulatory environment, 
at one site may produce multiple outcomes across other sites within these markets, 
which both produce and transform their own geographies. This highlights the 
potential significance of connections between sites, as well as sites themselves, as 
units of analysis. Finally, the paper advances a post-structural sensitivity to the 
ways in which the geographies of illicit and illegal markets are discursively 
rendered, and the potentially ideological effects of such framings. The paper, then, 
advances an economic geography perspective as a way of both understanding the 
constitution and operation of illicit and illegal markets and also their regulation.
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Drug Markets as Regional Phenomena
Prevailing official and, many, popular discourses that have evolved under the 
present policy regime have tended to view illegal drugs through a legal / 
institutional lens that has projected universalist / globalist interpretations across a 
series of, arguably, discrete phenomena. Thus, the question of illegal drugs has 
commonly come to be understood, within such discourses, as a singular problem 
of global proportions. However, different illegal drugs demonstrate enduring 
differences in their geographies of production, transit and consumption, 
circulating within largely distinct regional market contexts. Similarly, they 
demonstrate very different material and psychoactive properties. The logic of their 
constituting a single, global issue, then, as distinct from a series of multiple, 
regional issues, potentially dissolves in the face of these empirical distinctions. 
Such framings can be located within longer traditions of discursive elision of 
discrete phenomena into single categories within official discourses of illicitness 
(Hobbs 2013: 18; Levi 2009; Woodiwiss and Hobbs 2009). The primary 
implication of this is that such widely circulated readings of drugs markets help 
lend legitimacy to the present international policy regime whilst peripheralizing 
policy strategies that might emerge from alternative drug market ontologies. The 
emergence of pluralist schools of thought within the drug policy reform literature 
challenges such globalist imaginations and invites the emergence of alternative 
discursive framings of drug markets.
This discussion argues that readings of drug markets should emerge 
primarily out of their grounded empirics. Thus, it is important to interrogate the 
actual connections that exist between different drug markets in ways that will 
either sustain or challenge the conceptual reading outlined above. For example, 
Rengert (1996: 15) has outlined the emergence of the Colombian cocaine industry 
as, in part, the product of the increased interdiction of marijuana at the US border 
in the early 1980s. This prompted Colombian marijuana smugglers to move into 
the smuggling of cocaine (see also Castells 2000 on the transferability of criminal 
capacities within illicit market innovation in Colombia). Further Allen (2005: 124) 
points out that “many cocaine traffickers have diversified in scope by expanding 
into the production, smuggling, or distribution of methamphetamine, marijuana, 
and especially heroin, in accordance with their firm-specific competitive 
advantages. In doing so, they spread risks by gaining exposure to a variety of 
markets”. Clearly, criminal entrepreneurs do diversify and may operate across or 
move into alternative drug markets in ways that might challenge their construction 
as discrete phenomena. However, pursuing such inter-market connections has not 
emerged as a central concern of much drug market research, leaving us with only 
limited understandings of their nature and extent. This leaves us relatively poorly-
equipped to engage with the more ontological questions such observations raise.
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Potentially rethinking drug markets as distinct regional phenomena rather 
than a singular global phenomenon prompts a number of responses with regard to 
research and policy agendas. First, emerging from this is a sense of a potential 
logic of developing and deploying drug policies at the regional, transnational 
market level, rather than the national level. Such an approach would inevitably 
span multiple countries and would clearly face enormous political obstacles, with 
many regions including Russia, China, parts of the Islamic world, Japan and many 
African nations strongly opposed to liberal drug policy reform (Bewley-Taylor 
2012: 11; Collins, 2017: 292; Gomis 2012: 4; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 124-125). 
This would see a greater emphasizes on innovating drug policies within and for 
specific market and regional contexts and an explicit critical wariness of 
transferring policy strategies, even where they are successful within one regional 
drug market context, between different contexts (Felbab-Brown 2014: 47; Gomis 
2012: 14). As Babor et al. argue: “there is no single drug problem within or across 
societies, there is no magic bullet that will solve the drug problem” (2010: 253). 
Advocacy of shaping policy responses primarily around specific drugs and drug 
market contexts is something that is present within recent policy debates 
(Caulkins 2014: 17; Gomis 2012: 15; Hall 2017), if it is yet to gain significant 
purchase. One exception to this regional / market level approach might be 
marijuana markets which are, increasingly, more akin to multiple domestic 
markets than transnational regional markets (Caulkins 2015: 8). Here there may 
be more scope for national policy deployment than in other drug markets. Second, 
analysis of drug markets, might make the connections that exist between different 
markets a more central concern than has previously been the case. This would 
contribute to our understanding of the extent to which drug markets might be 
regarded, empirically and conceptually, as singular or discrete phenomena and 
any contingencies that relationships between markets might display. Third, the 
variegated character of these markets points to the effects of relationships between 
policies within markets, something that is picked up in the next section. Finally, 
as the discussion above suggests, prevailing official renditions of drug markets are 
a product of their current institutional framing. Evolving a more plural 
international drug policy regime suggests also evolving more nuanced discourses 
and representations alongside this which are more reflective of the empirics of the 
multiple, regional drug geographies of which they speak. Failing to challenge 
globalist discourses around drugs is likely to hamper changes in policy and 
attitudes towards them.
Drug Markets as Relational Phenomena
Drug markets operate across a series of sites at which interventions can be made. 
These sites are socio-spatial in nature and include the body of the user; the 
Page 5 of 30
Journal of Drug Policy Analysis
Journal of Drug Policy Analysis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
materialities of drugs; the localities of drug production, transit, exchange, 
consumption, control and treatment; broader urban and / or rural space; the state 
and nation; regional or transnational spaces of drug markets; global space and the 
sites of policy, perception and discourse. Different sites are characterized by 
different forms of intervention, typically involving different sets of actors. For 
example, the global level includes interventions in the form of international drug 
policy. The actors involved here include national governments and salient 
transnational institutions, most notably the International Narcotics Control Board 
and the UNODC, as well as those involved in public discussions of global 
regulatory regimes including journalists, academics, think tanks, politicians, 
campaigners, policing agencies, as well as civil society. By contrast, at the sites of 
the body of the user and the localities of drug retail and consumption, the 
interventions might be medical, public health, rehabilitative, policing or criminal 
justice in nature and be undertaken by actors including medical professionals, 
charities, local authorities, police and criminal justice systems. Traditionally these 
sites have been viewed as discrete and have tended to be approached by those 
engaged in interventions and academic commentators in primarily cellular rather 
than relational ways (DeVerteuil and Wilton 2009: 481), with attempts to trace the 
connections between different sites of intervention and their effects, at best 
secondary concerns. This is reflected in both policy and practice and in the 
multidisciplinary literatures of drugs and drug policy.
The extant literatures of drug policy reform make their case in a number of 
ways. These include: criticisms of the existing regime; explorations of the 
necessity for treaty change or the capacities for policy flexibilities within existing 
treaties; discussions of the principles that might guide drug policy reform; 
critiques of alternatives to or modifications of prohibition policies; and evaluative 
studies in the few, but growing, relatively affluent drug market countries that have 
undertaken permissive policy reforms (Babor et al. 2010; Gomis 2012; Hall 2017; 
Hughes and Stevens 2010; Inkster and Comolli 2012; LSE Expert Group on the 
Economics of Drug Policy 2014; 2016; Midgley et al. 2014; Wainwright 2016). 
This literature, though, ill-equips us to bridge to the modelling of international 
drug policy in a plural, post-'war on drugs' era. There remains, to date, little by 
way of conceptual modelling, empirical mapping and methodological assessment 
of the distribution of policies and their effects internationally. For example, the 
transferability of the findings of policy experimentation evaluations in places such 
as New Zealand, Portugal and Uruguay is fettered by the lack of comparable 
evidence from less affluent and secure regional contexts (Midgley et al. 2014: 23). 
This is not at all to dismiss the considerable insights of this literature or to 
underestimate the challenges it addresses (Baber et al. 2010: 258; Holmes 2016; 
Mansfield 2016: 127). However, with a few exceptions, even the more forward-
looking, policy-oriented of this literature offers only limited grounding for the 
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modelling of plural drug policy deployment within and across nations and regions, 
as opposed to the evaluation of policy options per se. This might profitably inform 
the next phase of drug policy reform literature and it is to this modelling of plural 
drug policy deployment that this paper speaks.
These limitations stem in part from a somewhat cellular approach across 
these literatures which overwhelmingly focuses analysis and discussion within 
single scales, usually the nation, single policies and single sites of intervention 
within the drug production, transit, consumption, treatment, policy, discourse 
nexus. There appears to be little dialogue, for example, between those approaches 
and literatures that speak of drugs and drug policy from the supply-side and those 
that speak of them from the demand-side. This is a reflection of the differential 
disciplinary orientations of academic literatures and the different institutional 
perspectives within drug policy circles. Supply-side literatures, for example, tend 
to originate from disciplines such as anthropology, criminology, political science, 
security studies and sociology and explore issues such as the damaging effects of 
international drug policies on producer and transit nations (Atuesta Becerra 2014; 
Gregory 2011; Inkster and Comoli 2012; Madrazo Lajous 2014; Mejia and 
Restrepo 2014; Watt and Zepeda 2012). Demand-side literatures, however, tend to 
emerge from within an alternative set of disciplines, most notably public health 
and those concerned with policing and the criminal justice system (Barbor et al. 
2010; Hall 2017; National Research Council 2014; Shiner 2016). The primary 
focus here differs and includes, in the case of public health perspectives, for 
example, drug use pathologies, their social costs and treatment (DeVerteuil and 
Wilton 2009: 483). Few drug policy literatures and policies themselves, then, are 
relational in the sense that they rarely consider, as a central concern, the 
implications of changing the contexts within which, say, drugs are consumed, 
through policy reform, for those contexts within which they are produced and 
transported (though see Caulkins 2015; Wainwright 2016). Whilst these issues are 
present in discussions to some extent, overall, looking across salient literatures, 
their treatment remains patchy and implicit. Consequently, these approaches tend 
towards being fragmented in that they operate in ways that are overly exclusive of 
each other. Gomis, with reference to policy formulation and implementation, is 
prompted to argue, then, that: “increasing the integration of policy across 
government, including law enforcement and public health organizations is 
essential because of the diverse nature of the drugs and organized crime problems” 
(2012: 19; see also Babor et al. 2010: 253; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 135-136; 
Sagrado et al 2016: 103; Shaw 2016: 89). To this we might add, equally, that 
there is the potential for such integration within the literatures of drug policy 
reform. 
It is argued here that it is an error to see and approach these sites of 
intervention in primarily cellular ways. Put simply, interventions at one site affect 
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conditions at other sites to which they are connected. This observation recasts 
drug markets through a relational ontology (see Dicken et al. 2001; Sheppard 
2002). Relational ontologies, despite their influence within a number of social 
science disciplines, have yet to gain much purchase within the multidisciplinary 
literatures of drugs and drug policy. Recasting drug markets in this way 
emphasizes the interconnections between their many socio-spatial sites of 
intervention as much as they do the sites of intervention themselves.
Economic geographers Rengett (1996) and Allen (2005) offer early 
examples of work that transcends the singularity of much drug literature and 
which might provide transferable models of relational readings of drugs markets. 
Here models, traditionally associated more with the analysis of the geographies of 
licit economies, have been used to explore the spatialities of drug production, 
trafficking, consumption and policy. To date geography has been a somewhat 
underpowered contributor discipline to debates on drugs and drug policy. For 
example, despite the contributions of the work cited here and others by 
geographers (Taylor et al. 2013), DeVerteuil and Wilton can argue (with regard to 
intoxicants generally rather than drugs specifically) that “geography’s 
contribution to the study of intoxicants is modest indeed... as well as quite 
fragmented” (2009: 480). Whilst geography’s drugs literature might be broad in 
its range (see Taylor et al. 2013), it is not deep. Often the authors cited here and in 
reviews such as those by DeVerteuil and Wilton and Taylor et al. are working 
within very sparsely populated fields. Rengert (1996) and Allen (2005), for 
example, remain the only economic geographers to produce published, 
empirically grounded accounts of illegal drug markets. Thus, the geographies of 
drugs literatures are yet to generate many ripples across either the wider 
geographical or drugs literatures. 
In response, the value of an integrative geographically sensitive 
perspective is advocated here which, it is argued, might transcend the prevailing 
singularity of the extant drug policy reform literature. Allen (2005: 123-124), for 
example, shows us that an intervention at one site (policy) is likely to have 
profound effects on all others across the drug nexus. He hypothesizes the effects 
upon “industry price structure, competitive balance and spatial organization” (123) 
were cocaine to be universally legalized. He notes potential multi-site impacts of 
this including upon the materialities of drugs (greater purity as firms compete 
more through product differentiation than price strategy), the spatial organization 
of production (likely shifts to Bolivia and Peru to take advantage of greater 
stability and better coca leaf quality there) and simpler transport geographies that 
no longer rely upon the smuggling expertize of Central American and Caribbean 
criminal groups. Caulkins’, similarly hypothetical, exploration of the likely effects 
of a single producer or transit country legalizing cocaine also highlights the 
connections between different sites of intervention and how the effects of 
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intervention at one site impacts on others. He shows that the effects of a producer 
country, such as Bolivia, legalizing cocaine, whilst, if its transit to market where it 
remains outlawed, cannot be achieved through its intermingling with licit cargo, it 
may have little effect on violent drug transit geographies through Mexico to the 
US, it is likely to shift those in Europe away from the present West African / 
Iberian Peninsula bridgeheads towards Eastern Europe. Here they are likely to 
take advantage of existing heroin and illicit cigarette smuggling routes into the 
European Union across its extensive, and relatively easily breached land border 
with, for example, Belarus (Caulkins 2015: 12). Overly cellular perspectives, then, 
run the risk of missing such impacts located beyond the immediate site of 
intervention, and spatial location, being scrutinized.
Whilst Allen’s and Caulkins’ and others (Caulkins et al., 2015a; 2015b; 
Caulkins and Kilmer, 2016) analyses sketch out hypothetical effects of drug 
policy change, there is a nascent literature looking at the effects of actual drug 
policy liberalization experiments that we are able to draw on here. The 
liberalization of cannabis production, retail and consumption, for medical and / or 
recreational use in a number of American states is well documented (UNODC 
2017: 45-54; Wainwright 2016). The effects of this policy intervention at state 
level have altered the legal context within which cannabis is consumed in those 
affected states, but it has also affected the contexts within which it is produced. 
Wainwright (2016: 243-259; see also Caulkins and Kilmer, 2016: 2084), for 
example, discusses the case of Colorado which has witnessed the localization and 
concentration of production away from dispersed, small scale home-based 'grow 
ops' (although there remains provision in the legislation for very small scale home 
production (UNODC 2017: 60)) and more extensive, spatially distant illegal sites 
run by organized crime groups in Canada and Mexico (Glenny 2008: 245-255; 
UNODC 2017: 37) into, often extensive licensed commercial units based close to 
market. Wainwright's discussion, part of a journalistic narrative is, at most, only 
implicitly relational in its perspective. It does, however, like Allen's, Rengert's 
and Caulkins' accounts, join the dots between different sites of intervention in this 
market in ways that are rarer in more circumscribed academic accounts. 
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the drug policy literature is 
unaware of the relational qualities of drugs markets. The emergent literature of 
prospective policy change is promising in this regard, regularly hypothesising or 
seeking evidence of the potential effects of changes to the regulatory environment 
on other sites such as the economics of production, drug use and potency, for 
example, (see Caulkins et al., 2015a; 2015b and Caulkins and Kilmer, 2016 on 
modelling the potential effects of marijuana legalization in Vermont). There 
remains, though, further work to be done along the multiple connections between 
sites of intervention within drug markets if we are to more fully understand the 
effects of interventions and to apply these insights to the deployment of policy.
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The paper now applies the geographical perspective outlined thus far to 
scrutinize a series of questions that emerge from discussions of drug policy 
reform. It turns first to the basic problematic of policy asymmetry.
Drug Policy Asymmetries
The question of pluralizing international drug policy is worthy of critical 
reflection not least because it is generally acknowledged within the literatures of 
illicit and illegal economies, and indeed those of licit economies, that regulatory 
and policy asymmetry is a bad thing that generates opportunities for arbitrage by 
criminal, and other, entrepreneurs (Allen 2005: 16; Hall 2013; 2018; Hudson 2014; 
2019; Midgley et al. 2014: 9; 35; Passas 2001). Advocacy of the pluralization of 
international drug policy, then, is a rare case of moving against what is generally 
considered axiomatic within literatures of illicit and illegal economies. 
The challenges of this are something to which the drug policy reform 
literature is attuned. We have discussions, for example, of negative externalities 
of drug policy asymmetry including displacement or 'balloon' effects (Bewley-
Taylor 2012: 296; Gomis 2012; McCoy 2004; Reuter 2014: 40; Taylor et al. 2013: 
418); grey cross-border markets, exploiting the provisional legality of some drugs 
(Babor et al. 2010: 4; Caulkins, et al., 2015a: 131-138; Caulkins and Kilmer, 2016: 
2086-2087; Felbab-Brown 2014: 48; Wainwright 2016: 255-257) and the 
potentially significant and wide-ranging effects on other countries of a producer 
or transit country unilaterally legalizing cocaine or heroin (Caulkins 2015; though 
see Collins, 2017: 293 on the likelihood of this occurring). The spectre of policies 
working against each other, producing a system lacking coherence, faintly haunts 
this literature, invoking calls for international agreements and cooperation 
(Collins 2014b: 14; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 120; Jelsma 2017; Reuter 2014: 
40).
Collins (2017: 292-293) is helpful in fleshing out some of the likely 
consequences of moving to a more asymmetrical drug policy regime. He argues 
that such a regime would clearly not be perfect, but it would, most likely, be 
better than the present (bad) symmetrical regime. He cites, for example, positive 
outcomes such as the collapse of illicit drug production in some regions and likely 
decreases in the levels of criminality associated with grey drugs markets as they 
become sustained by commodities that are diverted into their supply chains from 
legalized markets. He also notes possible negative outcomes such as organized 
crime groups formerly active in illicit drug markets seeking alternative income 
streams, and the negative economic impacts of the collapse of illicit production on 
poorer populations where few alternative livelihood opportunities exist. He 
further notes that to limit the international impacts of national policy 
experimentation requires that export is prevented, something that cannot be taken 
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for granted in an era of hyper trans-border mobility through opaque (licit and 
illicit) commodity channels (Nordstrom, 2007; Urry, 2014). Collins also alludes to 
the challenges of managing an asymmetrical drug policy regime: “The focus 
should be on determining where criminalisation is required to keep the market 
from becoming commercialised and how minimal necessary enforcement can be 
kept” (2017: 293). However, the extent of the challenges of effective management 
of diverse transnational policy, legal and regulatory terrains is well documented 
within the literatures of both licit and illicit markets (Allen 2005: 16; Hall 2013; 
2018; Hudson 2014; 2019; Midgley et al. 2014: 9; 35; Passas 2001) and might 
profitably inform drug policy reform research agendas.
Drug Policy Repatriation and the Extra-National
At its most basic, a plural drug policy regime inherently involves different drug 
policy strategies being enacted in different spaces. The scale through which the 
drug policy reform literature has imagined this is overwhelmingly, and 
understandably, that of the nation (Collins 2014b: 15; Hall 2017; Inkster and 
Comolli 2012: 134). The arguments for more nationally responsive drug policies 
follow the current universalist regime that has, it has been widely acknowledged, 
produced a series of geographically inequitable impacts across producer, transit 
and consumer nations (Inkster and Comolli 2012: 84; Mejia and Restrepo 2014: 
27). Bewley-Taylor, for example, captures the argument for a more plural 
international drug policy regime being characterized by some degree of drug 
policy “repatriation”: “This would permit nations... to bring policy formulation 
back to the national domain and allow the development and application of 
evidence-based public health-oriented policies that suit country-specific, even 
regional, circumstances” (2012: 299; see also Chatwin 2017: 82; Collins 2016b: 9; 
Gomis 2012: 14). 
Few contemporary-oriented discussions transcend this scale, and indeed 
the single-scale lens generally, and explicitly examine the dialectical relationships 
between national policy reform and factors and processes at extra-national scales 
(though see Caulkins 2015 and examples of transnational historical analysis: 
Collins, 2017; Courtwright, 2002; McAllister, 2000; 2012; Spillane, 2000). 
However, nascent geographical work on illicit and illegal economies reminds us 
that they are not solely the product of their local and national circumstances, but 
rather are “grounded in a subtle interplay between activities at different scales” 
(Hudson 2014: 780). If we consider the factors that contributed to a drop in US 
cocaine consumption in the late 2000s, for example, which is discussed in the 
following section, it is apparent that they are far from located exclusively within 
America's borders. They include, as well as factors internal to the US cocaine 
market, policies enacted and processes unfolding in a number of South American 
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cocaine producing nations, the Central American and Caribbean regions through 
which the majority of cocaine entering the US was shipped, West Africa, which 
emerged as a bridge into the European market (Reuter 2014: 37-38), and in 
European nations that witnessed a growth in demand for cocaine at this time 
(Kilmer et al. 2015; Kilmer 2016: 75). Whilst being spatially dispersed, what 
unites these spaces is their being part of a cocaine market, transcontinental in 
scope.
Whilst this example illustrates the potentially circumscribed ranges of 
national drug policies, a number of commentators have also outlined a series of  
characteristics of the contemporary global economy, that can be broadly 
summarized under the headings of asymmetry and opacity, that have undoubtedly 
had profound effects on the operation of illegal drug markets such as the 
transnational cocaine market discussed above. The criminogenic potentials of 
“structural disjunctures, mismatches, and inequalities in the spheres of politics, 
culture, the economy and the law” (Passas 2001: 23; see also Hall 2018: 102-103; 
Hudson 2019; Midgley et al. 2014: 35) have long been acknowledged and were 
discussed with reference to drug policy asymmetries above. In addition to the 
opacity generated through the development of a number of offshore secrecy 
spaces, through which large volumes of illicit finance, including drug revenues, 
are channelled (Denault 2007; Gomis 2012: 7; Hampton and Levi 1999; Hudson 
2000; Nordstrom 2007; Roberts 1995; Stewart 2012; Urry 2014), opacity also 
emerges through the hyper, trans-border circulation of commodities within a 
contemporary global economy which has realized “the greatest ever movement of 
material goods in human history” (Urry 2014: 34). Much of this movement takes 
place within the standardized shipping container, the volumes of which exceed 
inspection capacities in even the world's largest and most technologically 
sophisticated port spaces, creating micro spaces of opacity readily available to 
drug traffickers (Glenny 2008: 389; Martin 2016; Nordstrom 2007: 115; Urry 
2014: 33-34; Varese 2011: 77). The policies, that have facilitated these 
developments within the global economy, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, designed to grow licit trade, have been described as a “godsend” for 
large volume drug trafficking organizations (Allen 2005: 85; see also Watt and 
Zepeda 2012: 161) and other criminal entrepreneurs and have helped underpin 
significant expansions of a range of illicit / illegal transnational markets. This 
reminds us that, many policies that affect drug markets are not explicitly oriented 
towards drug issues (Babor 2010: 253). 
There are, then, potential problematics with the repatriation of drug policy 
under a more pluralized regime. Specifically, whilst it is clear how such locally 
responsive policies articulate with factors endogenous to the nation, what is less 
clear are the ways in which they might articulate with those at extra-national 
scales that also shape drug markets. The inherent limitations of national drug 
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policies have prompted some calls for action at the global level. For example, 
Midgley et al. (2014: 43) argue: “the success of domestic policies in developed 
nations for example should be informed by global as well as national 
considerations”. This returns us to the calls for multilateral cooperation, to 
provide some forum for the oversight and management of a plural international 
drug policy landscape, that, whilst they pepper the literature, remain scant of 
detail (see previous section). 
The preceding discussion is not to suggest that the drug policy reform 
literature is naive of these multi-scalar questions. Advocacy of national drug 
policy experimentation within this literature is typically predicated on an 
understanding of the complexities at other scales. However, there seems room to 
bring such questions more clearly to the fore within salient debates. For example, 
it would seem sensible not to restrict discussion of policies and their effects to the 
scales at which they are enacted. Specifically, discussions might profitably 
foreground the multiple dialectical relationships between national policy 
experimentation and factors and processes operating at extra-national scales. Part 
of this involves considering the articulation of national drug policies with non-
drug policies, such as trade policies, at the transnational level. Finally, this may 
more clearly open up the space within salient debates to consider scales other than 
the nation, such as the regional / market scale discussed earlier, as sites of drug 
policy reform and experimentation. 
Drug Policies in Combination
It is possible to discern, within the literatures of drug policy, traces that speak of 
the potential effects on drug markets of policies and processes working in 
combination. Kilmer (2016: 67), for example, explores the “unprecedented 
decline in the US cocaine market” in the late 2000s. Total consumption of pure 
cocaine in the US fell by approximately 50 per cent during this period according 
to a RAND estimate, with a concomitant rise in the purity adjusted price of 40 per 
cent. Whilst there is no consensus about the factors behind this decrease, Kilmer 
et al (2015) speak of a “perfect storm” of policy and non-policy processes that 
came together. Of these Kilmer cites: “the rapid increase in manual eradication, 
increase in interdiction, reduced availability of sodium permanganate, instability 
in Mexico, increase in non-US demand etc.” (2016: 75) and goes on to argue 
“Together these events may have had more of an impact on cocaine consumption 
in the US than the sum of their effects had they occurred at different times”. 
Although he does add “but this remains an open question”. If such a market 
disruption were ever categorically attributable to a set of policy interventions they 
would undoubtedly be regarded as a major success. Put simply, if drug markets 
are sustained by multiple factors and processes, multiple interventions, across 
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spatially dispersed sites, might be required to significantly disrupt them. However, 
whilst striking, this example represents only a single snapshot, of a single industry, 
at one point in time. The extent to which broader lessons can be drawn from this 
remains uncertain given the limited evidence base of the effects of grounded 
interactions of combinations of policy (and non-policy) factors on the operation of 
specific drug markets.
Elsewhere Babor et al. review the effectiveness of 43 drug policy 
strategies, finding evidence for 17 having a positive effect in more than one 
country. Intriguingly they argue “the cumulative and combined impact of the most 
effective policies could have a synergistic effect” (2010: 251), though this claim 
remains undeveloped in the ten conclusions they subsequent draw from their 
extensive policy review. Given the potentials suggested here, it is surprising that 
the literature offers little more than such anecdotes and tentative speculation and 
that research is yet to substantively address the potentially synergistic effects of 
multiple drug policies in combination, leaving us with the open question that 
Kilmer notes above. 
What this illustrates is not just the potentials of combinations of processes 
and policies operating together, but also that these might operate together both 
within and across sites in the drug production, transit, consumption chain. In 
applying potentials from cases such as these to drug policy development and 
deployment, it tentatively suggests that co-designing sets of policies directed 
towards, say, sites of drug production and drug transit, which in many cases will 
span transnational space, and explicitly attempting to ensure their mutual 
articulation across this transnational space, represents an avenue of drug policy 
development that might be explored further. However, synergistic approaches do 
not necessarily transcend the realities of divisions within policy circles around 
either enforcement or development oriented approaches (Midgley et al. 2014), 
divisions that are likely to shape the outcomes of any specific synergistic policy 
development. These divisions are particularly challenging for synergistic policy 
that might, potentially, suggest combinations of enforcement and development 
oriented approaches distributed towards different spaces across the drug nexus.
It is important, also, not to get uncritically caught up in the potentials of 
policy combinations to address problems associated with drug markets. Whist, the 
'perfect storm' example above is striking in its effects, it represents a case of 
multiple factors working together to produce a single outcome, the reduction in 
cocaine supply to the US. The problems of drug markets though are complex and 
multiple (Babor et al. 2010: 253; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 127). As yet, we lack 
the wealth of evidence, to say anything categorical about the potentials of policies 
in combination addressing multiple issues associated with drug markets. Further, 
we can observe instances of policies working together, both within and across 
sites, and having negative effects, for some at least, although it should be noted 
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the evidence base here also is very thin. Proudfoot (2017: 11), for example, 
discusses the deployment of safe injecting spaces in some Western cities within 
“ambivalent” social policy regimes. These, sites he argues, reflect the prevailing 
focus in harm reduction and public health approaches to drug use reduction on the 
individual (Rhodes et al, 2006: 1384) in that they involve treatments for drug 
users through regimes of bodily discipline. He records instances where these 
measures have been deployed within the context of official and popular moralistic 
discourses of drug abuse and revanchist local policies of urban development. The 
result here, as Rhodes et al. also note, has been their implication in “wider city 
strategies targeting the 'purification' of urban space, unwittingly contributing to 
the 'ghettoization' of drug users and other socially marginalized populations and 
their exclusion from public space” (2006: 1388). Proudfoot notes, for example, 
cases of the development of these safe injecting spaces in some cities being 
accompanied by expansions of law enforcement directed at the removal of those 
users who do not engage with these spaces of treatment (2017: 11). In addition, 
Shaw (2016: 89) has cited expanded discussion of health oriented policies in drug 
consumer countries being deployed in ways that obfuscate the expansion of 
traditional law enforcement approaches nearer the origins of drug supply chains, 
which could be seen as sops to 'hard liners'.
Whilst design, development and deployment of combinations of drug 
policies, including across transnational spaces, notwithstanding the very limited 
evidence base available, appears to merit further investigation, this suggests such 
approaches do not necessarily represent the elusive 'magic bullet' of drug policy 
(Babor et al. 2010: 253) and, like all approaches, require careful monitoring, 
management and evaluation.
Research and Policy Implications
It is appropriate now to consider the applications that stem from the arguments 
outlined here. Ideally we would have a set of policies that survive the scrutiny of 
the critical drug policy reform literature, be they alternatives to, or modifications 
of, prohibitive policies, which could then be modelled by regional drug market 
and / or by site of intervention and which would represent a geographically 
informed model of plural drug policy deployment. Unfortunately this is not yet 
the case for a number of reasons. It is possible, within the drug policy reform 
literature, to detect degrees of consensus around the challenges that face drug 
policy reform and the principles that might guide it, briefly outlined at the head of 
this paper, whereas this is less the case for specific policy measures that might 
come to the fore under a more plural, liberal, international drug policy regime.
The literature is broadly in agreement around the challenges that confront 
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drug policy generally. These include drug markets that are extensive, embedded 
and resilient to attempts to eradicate or reduce them, peopled, in part at least, by 
innovative and adaptive actors, and which generate problems that are complex, 
multiple and distributed (Allen 2005: 20; Atuesta Becerra 2014: 54; Babor et al. 
2010: 67; Bagley 2005: 37; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 67; Midgley et al. 2014: 33; 
Rengert 1996: 30-31; Shaw 2016: 89; Shiner 2016: 59). As if addressing the 
immanent challenges of drug markets were not enough for any reformed policy 
regime, the literature also identifies a series of external challenges related to the 
various environments through which drug policy reform must unfold. These 
include an international political environment that is far from universally 
welcoming of the possibilities of liberal drug policy reform, either because drug 
consumption is viewed through moralistic, ideological and / or religious lenses or 
because extant drug policies act as a trojan horse within which to pursue 
militarized, incursive foreign policy agendas (Bewley-Taylor 2012: 11; Gomis 
2012: 4; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 124-125; Taylor et al. 2013: 424; Watt and 
Zepeda 2012); discursive terrains that are highly politicized, often marginalize 
scientific evidence in the face of cultural preference and tend to view questions of 
drug markets and their address through a series of false binaries that obfuscate 
considerable commonalities and complexities (Babor et al. 2010: 288; Bewley-
Taylor 2012: 256-257; 288; Midgley et al. 2014: 20) and, evaluative contexts for 
which there are few agreed metrics, procedures or epistemologies that 
satisfactorily capture the complexities of policy change and its impacts across 
drug markets, from source to market and beyond (Hall 2017; Mansfield 2016: 127; 
Midgley et al. 2014; Thoumi 2016: 19). Finally, drug policy reform struggles with 
both the inherent challenges of effective regulation in the age of hyper 
globalization (Hudson 2019; Midgley et al. 2014: 35) and the restrictions that 
stem from the treaties that underpin the current regime (Bewley-Taylor 2012; Hall 
2017). We should note, however, that some, deploying historical and legal 
methodologies, recognize treaty flexibilities that offer the potential for policy 
reform without fundamental treaty change (Babor et al. 2010: 221-233; Collins 
2016b; 2017; Thoumi, 2016). These challenges suggest, then, that drug policy 
reform, at the extra-national level, requires dual fronts. Whilst plausible policies 
to address the immanent challenges posed by drug markets must be developed, it 
must also negotiate the contexts, above, through which this reform unfolds. The 
literature, discussed below, offers a range of policy options but only limited 
consensus on the former and recognizes the problematics of the latter but is less 
clear on the specifics of their negotiation.
Whilst a significant subset of the drug policy reform literature offers 
evaluations of specific policy options, it represents a range of positions and only 
limited consensus regarding policy alternatives to the present regime. Consensus 
tends to crystalize most around criticisms of this regime which is here universally 
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regarded as too punitive, too ineffective and the generator of extensive harms 
(Allen 2005: 111-112; Bewley-Taylor 2012: 14; Felbab-Brown 2014: 41; Inkster 
and Comolli 2012; Mejia and Restrepo 2014: 26; Sagredo et al. 2014: 97; 
Wainwright 2016). However, there is divergence around the degree to which it 
should be liberalized. We might here look to the work of Collins (2018) and 
Felbab-Brown and Porter (2016) who see policy pluralism primarily as a 
mechanism for experimentation, evidence gathering and feedback. This 
incrementalist / functionalist perspective sees policy experimentation occurring 
around the system’s more peripheral elements whist its core remains. However, 
these stances contrast to potentially more reformist positions. For example, 
Bewley-Taylor (2012) and Jelsma (2017) see a push towards policy pluralisation 
as, potentially, creating a domino effect that might trigger more fundamental 
systemic reform.
Certainly calls for policies based on the decriminalization or legalization 
and regulation of currently illegal drugs are not universal across this literature. 
Rather, there is a subset that advocates modifications to existing policies in the 
form of a “kinder, gentler” prohibition, at least for some drugs (Caulkins 2014: 24; 
see also Hall 2017: 10) characterized by less intensive policing (Babor et al. 2010: 
166; Collins 2014b: 14) coupled with mitigation of the harms of criminalization 
of drug users (Hall 2017: 8). Nor does this literature always call for the 
abandonment of the current supply-side policy architecture. Rather, there are calls 
for the continuing deployment, albeit in more strategic forms, of policies 
characteristic of the present regime including crop-eradication (Felbab-Brown 
2014: 41); interdiction (Gomis 2012: 18; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 134) and 
alternative livelihood strategies (Allen 2005: 56; Felbab-Brown 2014: 41), 
although claims for their efficacy typically come heavily qualified and they do 
face a literature that is strongly critical of such policies on the basis of evidence 
derived from evaluations of extant cases (Babor et al. 2010; Midgley et al. 2014). 
An alternative perspective emerges around calls for the decriminalization 
or legalization of drugs, typically within the context of a strong regulatory 
architecture (Caulkins 2016: 40; Hall 2017: 10). The strongest case is made here 
for the legalization of marijuana. Here though there is recognition of the limits of 
this policy shift including that it may not, depending on levels of taxation, entirely 
eliminate illicit trade (Gomis 2012: 6) and, in itself, will not address the security 
issues of developing drug producer and transit nations (Atuesta Becerra 2014: 49; 
Caulkins 2015), and some potentially negative consequences including possible 
increases in general and problematic consumption (Gomis 2012: 16; Caulkins 
2015: 19), disruption as criminal organizations seek out alternative revenue 
streams (Collins, 2017: 292; Inkster and Comolli 2012: 122) and specific 
concerns about the decriminalization / legalization of cocaine and heroin 
(Caulkins 2015:9; Hall 2017: 10). Whilst the academic literature leans heavily 
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towards decriminalization / legalization as a broad direction of travel, it does not 
represent a uniformly pro-decriminalization / legalization, anti-prohibition edifice.
Regardless of whether individual writers advocate modified prohibition or 
post-prohibition paradigms, there are four pillars within this literature for which 
there is general consensus. These are, the desirability of demand reduction in final 
drug market countries (Caulkins 2015: 4; Gomis 2012: 17-18; Rengert 1996: 128); 
the need to address corruption, improve governance and extend state presence in 
many drug production and transit nations (Felbab-Brown 2014: 43); following 
this, the development of policies that undermine the legitimacy of and / or directly 
target organized crime groups (Caulkins 2015: 4; Collins 2018: 112) and policies 
that recognize drug markets as products of deeper structural malaises, and which 
address underlying causes as well as their more visible manifestations (Rengert 
1996: 127-129; Proudfoot 2017: 14-15). If the drug reform literature could be said 
to offer pointers towards future avenues of policy development, based upon its 
levels of academic consensus, it would be in these four areas, coupled, perhaps, 
with the weight of calls in favour of decriminalization / legalization outlined 
above. However, as it stands, whilst there is clear consensus here at the level of 
principle, specific policies that emerge out of these are less apparent. This lack of 
specific policies is coupled with a series of challenges, salient to these principles. 
The wider organized crime literature is emphatic on the difficulties of successfully 
and sustainably tackling organized crime (Hall 2018; Madsen 2009; Midgley et al. 
2014). Intervening against organized crime in the context of drug markets is no 
exception. For example, successful law enforcement against individual organized 
crime groups operating within drug markets has been observed to generate a 
number of perverse outcomes. These include disrupting fragile, regional, inter-
group accords leading to increased levels of violence; providing opportunities for 
other criminal groups to expand; and stimulating innovation and, often, 
decentralization within illegal markets (Allen 2005: 20; Collins 2014: 10; Rengert 
1996: 30-31; Watt and Zepeda 2012). The barriers to translating principle into 
policy here, then, remain considerable.
Moving from a general critique of this literature to one more directly 
informed by the arguments of this paper highlights the scalar and spatially 
dispersed sites of effective drug policy intervention. For example, there is a 
literature, alluded to earlier, exploring the many opacities inherent in the global 
economy which points to the roles of banking secrecy, in both offshore and 
onshore spaces, in laundering the proceeds of corruption in the global South, 
including from those countries central to the production and transit of drugs (Dick 
2009: 98; Nordstrom 2007: 65; Stewart 2012: 38; Unger and Rawlings 2008: 332; 
Urry 2014: 46). Further, there is a small corruption literature that argues that 
corruption manifest in the global South, which tends to be overwhelmingly 
interpreted through an orientalist / moralist lens as as an endogenous failure of 
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Southern nations to meet Northern normativities of good governance, is, equally 
at least, relationally the product of illicit, neo-colonial relationships and practices 
by Northern governments, corporations and financial institutions acting upon and 
within the global South (Brown and Cloke 2004; Peel 2006). This multi-scale and 
relational production of corruption has tended to elude the gaze of some of the 
drug policy reform literature but suggests policy interventions at various sites and 
scales, including the global, and in the corporate, government and banking spaces 
of the global North as well as those of the global South.
In sum, looking across the drug reform literature, we note that, for all of its 
remarkable insights, it does not necessarily offer either a comprehensive 
prescription, in that it does not speak equally to all sites of intervention, there is 
little, for example, that addresses the discursive sphere of drug policy reform 
(though see geographers Proudfoot 2017; and Rengert 1996: 132) nor necessarily 
a coherent one, in that there is little here on how policies might co-articulate in 
combination. There might be an argument for the next phase of drug policy 
development to build policies from the broad areas of consensus within its 
literatures outlined above, through either a modified prohibition or post-
prohibition framework, and explore their deployment both regionally and 
relationally. This may offer an improvement on the present regime, but this still 
may be somewhat premature. In moving from a universalist towards a plural drug 
policy regime, founded on the potentials of deploying policies in combination and 
informed by regional and relational ontologies, there are many questions that 
remain insufficiently explored within the literature. Whilst we may not be at the 
point where we can confidently begin to model the deployment of more plural 
drug policies, we might consider the ways in which the research agenda might 
more explicitly inform the arguments presented here. Specifically it might:
 Explore the pluralist regulation of licit proxies, such as alcohol, which 
accommodate both regional and national differences and international cooperation, 
and to consider what lessons for drug policy reform can be learnt from such 
examples;
 Explore the potentially synergistic effects of deploying drug policies in 
combination;
 Explore the deployment of policies at the level of the drug market, rather 
than the nation, certainly for those drugs whose markets are overwhelmingly 
transnational;
 Explore the innovation of drug policies within specific market contexts 
and develop a critical wariness of policy transfer between drug markets;
 Explore the ways in which drug policies can be deployed differentially 
within drug markets; 
 Explore the connections that exist between drug markets more explicitly 
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and extensively and the extent to which drug markets can be considered 
empirically distinct phenomena;
 Explore the connections that exist within drug markets more explicitly and 
extensively, and specifically the effects of interventions at one site on other sites 
of intervention across drug markets;
 Explore forms of international cooperation and the networking of policies 
together within drug markets and the ways in which discrete policies in different 
spaces may co-articulate or, on the other hand, work against each other;
 Explore the ways in which global scale enablers of illicit markets can be 
addressed and the roles of 'non drug' policies in undermining global opacities and 
asymmetries;
 Explore further the relationships between the processes of drug policy 
reform and the various contexts (political, discursive, evaluative and regulatory) 
through which it is negotiated and unfolds.
Conclusion
This paper echoes those that highlight the failings of the present international drug 
policy regime. Similarly, it echoes those who call for explorations of drug policy 
pluralization, whilst recognizing potential dangers in its uncritical embrace. It 
argues, on the basis of the evidence presented here, that there are many 
geographies of drug policy pluralization and geographical effects of it with which 
the literature has yet to fully engage. It advocates that geographical reflections 
inform efforts to move beyond the present, creaking, universalist ‘war on drugs’ 
towards a more plural international drug policy landscape.
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1. Reviewer comment: “I think the introduction could include a more thorough outline of the 
geographical principles that are to be applied, at present they are only alluded to, with more focus on 
the drug policy foundations for the piece. Given the introduction is relatively short, I think it could be 
expanded to include this”.
Response: Yes absolutely agree. At the moment the geographical principles are far too implicit. To 
address this I have done two things. i) inserted a section after the introduction ('economic geographies 
of illicit and illegal markets') that brings out the geographical principles far more clearly. ii) I have 
also restructured the paper, bringing the sections on 'regional ontologies' and 'relational ontologies' 
forward and presenting these more explicitly as interpretations of drug markets that emerge through 
an economic geography reading of them, and I have moved the present sections 2, 3 and 4 ('drug 
policy asymmetries', 'drug policies in combination' and 'drug policy repatriation' and presented them 
more explicitly as rethinking drug policy reform through the lens of economic geography. The overall 
logic of the paper is now clearer and more explicit in the ways in which it is the product of an 
economic geography imagination.
2. Reviewer comment: “Re. counter arguments for pluralisation – may want to look at Collins 2017 
where the conclusion attempts to address some of these concerns around arbitrage”.
Response: Yes agreed. Collins is referenced initially to balance Caulkins claims of the ‘grand 
fracture’ should one country unilaterally legalise cocaine or heroin. This is further developed with the 
addition of a new paragraph which summarises the impacts of asymmetry from Collins 2017. The 
conclusion from this is that whilst policy asymmetry is unlikely to be perfect, it is likely to be better 
than the current (bad) policy symmetry. However, this section, drawing on the lessons of regulatory 
asymmetry drawn from the literatures of both licit and illicit trades, argues that the challenges of 
managing asymmetry should not be underestimated, and might inform drug policy reform research 
agendas.
“Collins (2017: 292-293) is helpful in fleshing out some of the likely consequences of moving 
to a more asymmetrical drug policy regime. He argues that such a regime would clearly not 
be perfect, but it would, most likely, be better than the present (bad) symmetrical regime. He 
cites, for example, positive outcomes such as the collapse of illicit drug production in some 
regions and likely decreases in the levels of criminality associated with grey drugs markets as 
they become sustained by commodities that are diverted into their supply chains from 
legalized markets. He also notes possible negative outcomes such as organized crime groups 
formerly active in illicit drug markets seeking alternative income streams, and the negative 
economic impacts of the collapse of illicit production on poorer populations where few 
alternative livelihood opportunities exist. He further notes that to limit the international 
impacts of national policy experimentation requires that export is prevented, something that 
cannot be taken for granted in an era of hyper mobility through opaque (licit and illicit) 
commodity channels (Nordstrom, 2007; Urry, 2014). Collins also alludes to the challenges of 
managing an asymmetrical drug policy regime: “The focus should be on determining where 
criminalisation is required to keep the market from becoming commercialised and how 
minimal necessary enforcement can be kept” (2017: 293). However, the extent of the 
challenges of effective management of diverse transnational policy, legal and regulatory 
terrains is well documented within the literatures of both licit and illicit markets (Allen 2005: 
16; Hall 2013; 2018; Hudson 2014; 2019; Midgley et al. 2014: 9; 35; Passas 2001) and might 
profitably inform drug policy reform research agendas.”
3. Reviewer comment: “P4: ‘typically remains elusive’: I agree that this hasn’t been fleshed out, but I 
think this is a little simplified...”.
Response: Yes absolutely agree. The phrase ‘typically remains elusive’ has been cut from the end of 
this paragraph but has also been deployed to form the basis of a new paragraph that has been inserted 
into the 'Research and policy implications' sections towards the end of the paper. This expands upon 
this point drawing on the ideas and sources raised by the reviewer in their further discussion of this 
point. I have also reinforced the point about some historical and legal scholars, such as Collins, 
recognising the potential for treaty flexibility just before this insertion. This new paragraph is given 
below.
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“We might here look to the work of Collins (2018) and Felbab-Brown and Porter (2016) who 
see policy pluralism primarily as a mechanism for experimentation, evidence gathering and 
feedback. This incrementalist / functionalist perspective sees policy experimentation 
occurring around the system’s more peripheral elements whist its core remains. However, 
these stances contrast to potentially more reformist positions. For example, Jelsma (2017) and 
Bewley-Taylor (2012) see a push towards policy pluralisation as, potentially, creating a 
domino effect that might trigger more fundamental systemic reform.”
4. Reviewer comment: “[i] I think there is overreach on the synergies point. Kilmer’s paper 
represents a snapshot of a single market at a specific time. Whether there are genuinely broader 
lessons to be drawn needs more analysis than is presently offered. [ii] Similarly I think the recognition 
of the need for synergistic or a multifaceted drug policy is widely recognised. The contention arises 
around which types of policies. E.g. suggesting linking the production and transit elements is 
interesting, but the outcomes of such a thought experiment differ radically depending on one’s policy 
predilections – greater uniformity of enforcement, or greater focus on broader development indicators 
at the expense of drug law enforcement.”
Response: [i] Yes, absolutely agree. I have added a sentence based on the reviewer’s comment to 
acknowledge the limits of this example. [ii] Again, agreed. A short section (below) has been added to 
acknowledge this significance of different policy-orientation positions in shaping the outcomes of any 
synergistic policy developments.
“However, synergistic approaches do not necessarily transcend the realities of divisions 
within policy circles around either enforcement or development oriented approaches (Midgley 
et al. 2014), divisions that are likely to shape the outcomes of any specific synergistic policy 
development. These divisions are particularly challenging for synergistic policy that might, 
potentially, suggest combinations of enforcement and development oriented approaches 
distributed towards different spaces across the drug nexus.”
5. P5: Reviewer comment: “discussion of ‘harm reduction’ isn’t clear and suggests perhaps some 
confusion around the concept of ‘harm reduction’ in the field of drugs. Would suggest reading work 
by Tim Rhodes, Joanne Csete and others to gain further insight into this and help clarify what is being 
alluded to here. Shaw’s point on obfuscation is largely right, but is political as much as academic – 
that ‘harm reduction’, a term with deep and entrenched political connotations within the drug control 
field, ultimately impedes principles of ‘reducing harm’ when applied to policy around the supply of 
illicit drug markets.”
Response: The main thrust of this section is the potentials and problematics of deploying policies in 
combination. Whilst absolutely acknowledging the referee's point here I am keen to avoid the section 
side-tracking into a discussion of debates around harm reduction which would deflect from the main 
thrust of the section and open up debates for which there is insufficient space in the paper to fully 
consider. To this end I have been more specific in my discussion of the case study, referring 
specifically to 'safe injecting spaces', rather than 'harm reduction approaches' in the first instance 
which is the measure that Proudfoot discusses in the case I cite. I have also cite Tim Rhodes' work 
here to acknowledge some of the complexities around harm reduction approaches that the referee 
alludes to. I have replaced the original passage with the revised one below.
“Proudfoot (2017: 11), for example, discusses the deployment of safe injecting spaces in 
some Western cities within “ambivalent” social policy regimes. These, sites he argues, reflect 
the prevailing focus in harm reduction and public health approaches to drug use reduction on 
the individual (Rhodes et al, 2006: 1384) in that they involve treatments for drug users 
through regimes of bodily discipline. He records instances where these measures have been 
deployed within the context of official and popular moralistic discourses of drug abuse and 
revanchist local policies of urban development. The result here, as Rhodes et al. also note,  
has been their implication in “wider city strategies targeting the 'purification' of urban space, 
unwittingly contributing to the 'ghettoization' of drug users and other socially marginalized 
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populations and their exclusion from public space” (2006: 1388). Proudfoot notes, for 
example, cases of the development of these safe injecting spaces in some cities being 
accompanied by expansions of law enforcement directed at the removal of those users who do 
not engage with these spaces of treatment (2017: 11).”
6. Reviewer comment: “Re. Repatriation: I think in the policy literature this is correct. Not so in the 
historical literature. E.g. look to Collins and changing opium regimes during WWII and beyond vi 
also McAllister, Spillane and Courtright for top level historical analyses of changes in drug 
regulations and markets”.
Response: Yes, agreed. A note has been added to this effect including reference to a number of 
transnational / multi-scale histories of drugs and their regulation.
7. Reviewer comment: “I think the introduction of critical concepts, such as ‘endogenous gaze’ could 
indeed be useful, but there isn’t sufficient interrogation of them within the article at present.”
Response: Whilst I accept this comment I haven't developed this idea any further here. The changes I 
have made to the paper to address the other points have added to its length. I think to develop this idea 
further here would require more space than is reasonably available. I have cut the reference to 
'endogenous gaze' within the paper but will consider developing it further in a future piece.
8. Reviewer comment: “Re. Scalar Hierarchy: I fear a strawman here as I don’t know of anyone 
arguing that drug markets aren’t interconnected across geographical frontiers as well as imagined 
frontiers. I understand about applying the idea to repatriation, but the idea of local experimentation as 
being based on a lack of awareness about these dynamics doesn’t seem the right criticism. I think 
local experimentation as an idea is often predicated on the recognition of the complexity of the 
international system.”
Response: Agree that the argument through this section could be much clearer so there has been some 
rewriting and restructuring to make this so. I have made it much clearer and much more explicit 
throughout that the main thrust of this section is the potentially problematic relationship between 
policy repatriation at the national level and factors and processes that operate at extra national scales. 
This includes slightly amending the title of the section and reordering the introduction section. I have 
cut the reference to the example of coca field elimination as this only muddies the main thrust of the 
section. I have also added a paragraph at the end that acknowledges that the drug policy reform 
literature is not naive on the point of the multi-scalar constitution of drug markets and argues that 
discussions of policy reform might also embrace more explicitly discussions of the dialectical 
relationships between policies enacted at one scale and processes that unfold at other, multiple scales, 
and that they might also admit more discussion of scales other than the nation as the scales at which 
reform might be enacted. On the last point the discussion again draws attention to the regional / 
market scale as one at which policy experimentation and reform might be directed.
9. Reviewer comment: “P.8: ‘prevailing discourses…’: this para is a little confused and I think 
actually contradicts some of the authors’ thrust inadvertently. Again it risks offering too unified a 
sense of the pluralistic schools of thought, many of which are self-consciously constructed to offer 
counter-‘globalist interpretations’.
Further, the point on universal prohibition isn’t clearly made, with the overall point obscured. 
McAllister, Collins and Thoumi are three authors arguing the legal complexity of ‘prohibition’ under 
international law. Toby Seddon has written extensively on this within legal theory contexts”.
Response: Agree that the meaning of this paragraph could be clearer. I have made it much clearer 
here that I am referring to official and (some) popular discourses of drugs rather than academic ones 
from the drug policy reform literature. I have added a sentence that explicitly acknowledges that the 
pluralist perspectives within the drug policy reform literature challenge the globalist imaginations that 
I note here. I have also removed the reference to prohibition as this adds little and is peripheral to the 
main point of the paragraph. Further in the next paragraph I have emphasised more clearly that what 
this suggests is the potential for pluralising drug policy at the market / regional level, rather than the 
national level.
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10. Reviewer comment: “There are key literatures on market regulation which would need to be 
incorporated. E.g. see the work of RAND on Vermont and subsequent works.”
Response: Agreed. This is an important source. I have included references to the original report for 
Vermont and two subsequent works that came from this analysis at a number of points within the 
article where they inform the points I am making. 
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